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WHEN HMO PATIENTS
CAN'T GET NO SATISFACTION
Ardyth J. Eisenberg

INTRODUCTION
As work on this article began, newspapers announced that health

maintenance organization (HMO) members' satisfaction with their
health plans had declined and litigation against HMOs about the quality
of patient care was increasing.' Information released by Hewitt
Associates, a national benefits consulting firm, in late 1999 indicated
that 22 percent of members were dissatisfied with their managed care
plans in 1998, compared to 17 percent in 1997.2 In 1998, 30 percent
reported they were not satisfied with their plans' "timeliness,
professionalism or accuracy."' Another national consultant reported
that enrollment in HMOs had dropped for two consecutive years, to 46
percent of all workers, while enrollment in more flexible preferred
provider organizations increased in 1998, to 43 percent of all workers.'

"Staff writer, DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CAPE Liw. Master's degrce

in Public
Administration, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1957); 1D.,
DePaul University College of Law, 2001.
'"As politicians and plaintiffs [sic] attorneys attack health maintenance organizations and
their limitations on doctor choices, workers are moving to less restrictive forms of health
insurance..." Bruce Japsen, Workers Choosing Less Restrictive Health Plans,Cm. Tr-.a, Dee.
14, 1999, at 3-3. See also, Bruce Japsen, DoctorPower No Cure-all,CH. TRIB., November 10,
1999, at
3-2.
2
Japsen, supra note 1.
3
See id.
4
See id.
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At the same time, the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for
Pegram v. Herdrich to determine whether an HMO's performance
incentives for its physicians violated the fiduciary duty requirements of
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA)A At a time
when HMO enrollment has reached an all-time high, both popular and
legal pressures have come to bear on the entire nature of the managed
care arrangement.
This Comment will explore whether I-MO patient satisfaction
levels indicate the likelihood of litigation being filed against the HMO.
It begins by examining the evolution of managed care arrangements,
then considers the ways the public and patients can record their
satisfaction with health care received through HMOs. After briefly
explaining HMO accreditation processes and rating systems, the
Comment analyzes appellate-level cases against HMOs rated highly
and lower in several published rankings. Finally, the Comment
considers how HMOs may respond to litigation by dissatisfied
members.
BACKGROUND
From Private Care to Managed Care
The evolution of health care financing has generated entire textbooks,
and is known to most people interested in health care. Nevertheless, a
review of the early differences between HMOs and commercial health
insurance offers insight to the current convergence of dissatisfaction
and litigation that surrounds HMOs.6
Until the early 1980s, HIMOs and prepaid medical plans 7 operated
separately from and in competition with health insurers.! They enrolled

5

Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000).

6

For clarity and consistency, this article relies on the National Committee for Quality
Assurance's definition of health maintenance organization ("HMO"): It is a health plan that
furnishes health care in return for a specific monthly payment. The health care is usually
delivered by a network of health care providers, which the HMO members must use, in order to
receive paid-for care. NATIONAL COMMIT-EE FOR QUALITY AssURANCE, Choosing Quality:
Finding
the
Health
Plan
That's
Right
for
You,
at

http://www.ncqa.org/pages/communications/publicationsbrotext.
7
Prepaid medical plans consisted of contracts between employee or employer groups and
individual physicians. The group agreed to pay the physicians a fixed monthly fee and the
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only a minority of people. 9 HMOs served as the only source of medical
care for their members. The actual care came from limited panels of
physicians and hospitals which had either contractual, employment or

ownership relationships with the HMO." In this sense, early HMOs
both provided for and financed health care. Members' prepayment of
specified fees ostensibly gave the HMOs (and their affiliated hospitals
and physicians) an incentive to deliver care efficiently."
By contrast, health insurers at the time were normally branches of
large commercial insurance companies."- They lacked formal

arrangements with physicians and hospitals and did not place limits on
the members' choices of health care providers. 13 Although they
assumed financial risk for the resulting medical costs, the insurers had

physicians agreed to provide all the medical care the employees required. PA L Svwnr,
SocIAL TRANSFOPIATION oF AmRIcAN

THE

1EDICIrE 301-06 (1982).

8See id at 29S, quoting DoucLAs MAcINTYRE, VoLLUNTR Hr-,uT lNSULVCE ,D

RATE ARNiaLR
124-25 (1962). "Insurance theory says that the hazard insured against should be

definite and measurable. In some respects service contracts were like blank checks for
[patients], physicians and hospitals; they were open-ended and did not limit the plans' dollar
liabilities." See id at 27 (discussing the medical profession's use of prepaid medical plans to
maintain physicians' independence from hospitals and health insurers: "Prepaid health plans,
now called 'health maintenance organizations,' represent a competitive form of bureaucratic
organization in medical care. Insurance companies, under pressure to control medical costs,
search for methods to regulate medical decisions.").
9
1n 1972, the country had fewer than 40 HMOs, which enrolled about 3 nullion people.
Tom J. Manos, Take Half an Aspirin and Call Your HMO in the Morning - Mcdical
Malpracticein Managed Care. Are HMOs PracticingMedicine Without a License9 , 53 U.mv.
MtwAu L. REv. 195,202 (Oct. 1998).
10See id See also, David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today La., Cases,
Theories, and CurrentIssues, 33 J. HEALTH LAv 191 (Spring 2000),
""[Minnesota physician Paul M] Ellwood had been tr)ing for several years to get a
hearing [at the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare] for his view that reform of
the health system had to address its 'structural incentives.' In rehabihitation, as in other fields,
fee-for-service payment penalized medical institutions that returned patients to health. The
financing system, Ellwood argued, ought to reward health maintenance; prepayment for
comprehensive
care would achieve that end." STARRY, supra note 7,at 395.
2
1 Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans "straddle the line" betveen commercial insurers and
IMOs. They were prepaid, nonprofit plans, but did not own or operate ho-pitals or medtal
practices. While they had contractual relationships with many independent hospitals and
physicians, the plans did not normally limit members' choices of health care protders, as did
HMOs. See id at 295-310. Starr goes on to note, "American priate insurance %.as 'pigeybacked' on preexisting organizations[,]. .the voluntary hospitals, the medical profession, and
the life insurance industry." See id at 332.
13See id at 291-92.
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no involvement in the delivery of actual care. 4 Generally, commercial
insurers had a financial arrangement with members but no involvement
in the actual delivery of care. 5
The insurance arrangement drew criticism in the early 1970s for
contributing to escalating health care costs by creating incentives to
provide too much and unnecessary care. 16 "From different directions,
the efficiency-oriented and the rights-oriented critics had arrived at
many of the same reform proposals."' 7 The result was the passage of
the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973. 1 At this time, health
policy makers believed HMOs could neutralize incentives for
physicians to increase their income by providing unnecessary care. 19 By
limiting payments to physicians and providing regular preventive
treatment, which insurers at that time did not cover, HMOs would
create incentives to keep patients healthy.20 The Act promoted the
development of HMOs through start-up grants and marketing
advantages that allowed them to compete with health insurers.2'
Nevertheless, health care costs continued to rise, making HMOs more
attractive to employers.
As employer interest in HIMOs grew, so did investor interest. In
1981, only 18 percent of all HMOs were for-profit, and they enrolled
only 12 percent of all HMO members. 22 By 1997, the for-profits
4

See id.

' 5See id.

16The Federal government, private business and individuals all perceived "a crisis of

money" in the health care system in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with pronouncements by
President Nixon, BusmIEss

WEEK

and FORTUNE, among others. STARR, supra note 7, at 381-88.

"[A] more fundamental explanation [for rising health care costs] lay in the basic incentives in
the health care system, especially its financing arrangements..." See id. at 384.

"See id. at 393.
' 8See id. at 394-98.
19STARR, supra note 7. President Nixon, in a speech specifically addressing the health
care cost crisis, announced HMOs as "a new national health strategy" to correct the traditional
system, which operated on "illogical incentive[s]" that caused health care providers to profit
from sickness
rather than from health. STARR, supra note 7, at 395.
20

To qualify under the Act, HMOs had to offer treatment for mental health and alcohol

and drug abuse, home health services and family planning services, and accept, at least once a
year, any
21 enrollee, regardless of the person's health status. See id. at 400-01.

See id.

22Susan Meltsner, For-profitOr Not: Where's the Best Care?, BUSINESS & HEALTH, July

1998, at 46. See also, STARR, supra note 7, at 439: "Large, multi-unit corporations are also
gaining a major position in the organization of HMOs. At the beginning of the 1970s, the
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occupied the field, representing 75 percent of all HMOs and 62 percent
of all HMO patient enrollment.2 The investors included many private
health insurers that had earlier eschewed the HMO approach of
providing direct care.24 These "traditional" programs had come to be
seen as "the most expensive insurance option. '"' To keep prices down,
the insurers followed the lead of the HMOs and sought discounted fees
and capitation arrangements:6 from private providers to establish
"virtual" HN4Os.27 This arrangement shifted some of the financial risk
for delivery of care to the contracting providers.3
Although the insurers frequently advertised that "their" providers
were of the highest quality, they disclaimed any involvement in the
actual delivery of care by identifying hospitals and physicians as
independent contractors. Share Health Plan of Illinois, defendant in

prepayment plans, except for Kaiser, were locally controlled. None were profit-mking
companies. By 19S0 the majority of HMOs were being drawn into several large netv;orks run
by Kaiser, Blue Cross, INA, and Prudential ...
Surviving HIMO3 will increasingly bccome.pa.rt
of large corporate networks."
2Meltsner,
supranote 22.
24STApR, supra note 7, at 291. The National Committee for Quality Assurance, discuszced
below, accredits HMOs operated by Aetna U.S. Healthcare tformarly Aetna Insurance
Company), CIGNA Healthcare, Prudential Healthcare and NYLCare. National Committce for
Quality Assurance, at http://wvw.ncqa.org.
25Jeannie Mandelker, The Unprecedented Shift to Managed Care Is Resulting in Lower
Health Care Costs, 13 Bus. & HEALTH 8 (Jan. 1995).
26Under capitated arrangements, health care providers receive a fixcd monthly fez for
every HMO member they treat, no matter how many or how few mcdical services are required.
See id. HNMOs determine the fixed fee from the number and kind of services mmbri are likely
to require in the future. But, this budgetary approach also gives physicians a reason to reduce or
delay services, because they will receive their monthly payment from the HMO anyv, ay. Trudy
Lieberman, Choosingan HMO, CONSUMERREP., Aug. 1996, at 32.

27
Originally, IMOs employed their own physicians or groups of phyzicians, vho
worked only for one HMO and saw only patients who were members of the IMO. Liebzrman,
supra note 26. The HMOs could also own their own hospitals and clinics. In this ccns, the
HMO had a physical identity that was clear to its health care providers and to the members who
used those providers. See STAPP, supra note 7, at 322. By contrast, newer WM03 consist of
independent hospitals and physicians in private practice, who work in their own offices. The
hospitals and physicians are tied to the MO through contractual, not ovnership or
employment arrangements, and they are likely to contract with a number of HMOs or health
insurance companies. See Lieberman, supra note 26. These HMOs have no phy-.ical identity,
other than their business offices, and work through providers who do not have an exclusive
loyalty to any particular HMO.
28Lieberman, supra note 26.
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Petrovich v. Share, is an example:29 Its member handbook stated it
would provide "comprehensive high quality services," but also
demurred: "The SHARE Plan physician is solely responsible for the
medical services provided to any Member."30
Nonetheless, the contractual arrangements placed a third party into
what was once a private interaction between patient and provider."
Where once the frustrations of dealing with health insurance red tape
occurred after the delivery of care, now the insurer's involvement
begins before the care can be provided.3" Both a legal conundrum and a
marketing dilemma have resulted: While health insurers have followed
HMOs in shifting financial risk to providers, and have represented
themselves to patients as sources of health care, they have sidestepped
most legal risk for that care.
Measuring HMO Performance
The reinvention of the American health care financing system has
transformed the physician-patient relationship into a shaky triangle of

patient-HMO, IMO-physician and physician-patient arrangements. "
The concept of prepayment, once the hallmark of a handful of not-forprofit medical plans, has displaced much of fee-for-service medicine, to
29

Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Docket No. 85726, 1999 IlL. LEXIS 970, at
*7 (Sup. Ct. of ll., Sept. 30, 1999).
"See id.at *9-*10.
3
h'Today, however, one might ask whether patient rights are compatible with managed
care. After all, much of the impetus for managed care was to counter the rising demand for, and
cost of, medical care. Much of the managed care industry's success in lowering ...costs may
be attributed to limiting patient choices and treatments, especially with regard to the length of
hospital stays. Indeed, the managed care industry does not speak of the rights of 'patients.'
Instead, it describes the rights and responsibilities of members or consumers." Wendy K.
Mariner, Standards of Care and StandardForm Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and
Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH LAw & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1998).
Mariner goes on to discuss the thinking of Professor George J. Annas, an expert in patient
rights who has questioned managed care's effort to turn the patient into a consumer and thereby
lose valuable protections that patients have, but consumers lack. See id. at 3. Mariner notes,
"Everyone is, or will be, a patient, whether or not one has health insurance. The rights of
patients developed outside the context of commercial markets, independently of health
insurance..."
See id. at 7.
32
STARR, supra note 7, at 291-92. See also, Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountabilityfor
Utilization
Review in ERISA Health Plans,77 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1999).
33
Ironically, this conglomeration of contracts, developed separately, over decades, may
leave the patient the least protected of the parties, but that is a topic for another article.
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become "the cornerstone of the health care industry octopus of the
nineties..."'
[Ciapitation clearly shifts the incentives physicians have to a
more conservative management of patient care.. .in an
environment where clinical decisions must be weighed
against questions of appropriate resource utilization.... The
capitated physician is rewarded for preventing illness, so in
theory, prevention, patient education, and screening should be
far more important than in [fee-for-service] settings. 5
In the public's perception, the dark side of preventions admirable
goal emerged at least as the potential deprivation of necessary care."
"Health maintenance organizations have been chided, in the pages of
Business & Health and elsewhere, for being too closely identified with
cost containment. That emphasis ... causes consumers and lawmakers
to doubt the quality and accessibility of medical care in HMOs."I The
perception that iMOs under-serve rather than promote prevention has
produced a number of formal and informal measures of HiMO
performance. 3s These measures, which will be discussed below,
include:
o Accreditations by the nonprofit HMO accreditation body, the
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA)

supra note 7, at 291-92.
See id at 175.
36
How Good Is Your Health Plan?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1996, at 28, describing
articles from the popular press titled "Death by HMO - One Woman's Horror Story" and
"HMOs: What You Don't Know Could Kill You."
34STARR,
35

37Karen Ignani, Don't Choose an HMO Just to Save Moncy, 13 BUs. & HFrALrH 56, 56
(July, 1995).
3
Dwight McNeill, Wiat's Happened to Employers Push for Quality. 17 Bus. &

26, 26 (April 1, 1999) (discussing corporations' use of purchasing groups to develop
information about health plans, use of national data sets, and activities of independent
HEALTH

monitoring groups); Barbara Sande Dimmnitt, Accreditation, What's the Big Deal, 13 Bu3. &

December 1995, at 38 (analyzing the increase in requiring private accreditation of
managed care organizations and the perceived correlation between accreditation and quality of
HEALTH,

care); Shelly Reese, What's Behind Those Satisfaction Surveys?, S BuS. & HEALTH, August 1,

1997, at 29 (reporting on the shortcomings of using surveys to assess members' satisfaction
vith their managed care plans).
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" "Report cards" prepared by employers and national magazines
* Turnover rates of members
Accreditation
Similar to the Joint Commission of Accreditation for Hospitals, which
evaluates most American hospitals, the National Commission for
Quality Assurance (NCQA) develops and maintains accreditation
standards for HMOs.39 It uses these standards and site visits to rate
HMOs. 40 NCQA's Quality Compass, a national database of accredited
HMOs, is available to the public on its website. 4 While accreditation is
voluntary, most HMOs in the country seek it and many major
4
employers will not offer HMOs that do not have NCQA accreditation. 1
In addition to accreditation, the NCQA's Health Plan Employer Data
and Information Set (HEDIS) has become the "measurement system of
choice among managed care plans, many of whom report [the] data to
employer clients or use [it] to inform their quality improvement
efforts." 43 Many HMO members can also obtain this data through their
employers.M HEDIS measures and compares HMOs' results in
delivering health care, including providing immunizations, screening
for serious health conditions, managing chronic conditions like high

39

The standards, over 60 in all, look at members' access to care, the levels of medical
and customer service delivered, how the HMO evaluates its doctors, the preventive health
services delivered, delivery of care to sick members and treatment of chronic conditions. The
assessment does not include a review of an HMO's pending or settled lawsuits. National
Committee
for
Quality
Assurance,
http://www.ncqa.org/pages/main/overview3.htm.
40

An

Overview,

available

at

See id.

41

See id.

42

See id. Among the companies that require or request an HMO's accreditation before

allowing employees to enroll are American Airlines, AT & T, Citibank, Chrysler, Federal
Express,
Ford, General Electric, IBM, PepsiCo, United Parcel Service and Xerox.
43
See id.
"How Good Is Your Health Plan?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1996, at 28; How Does Your
HMO Stack Up?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1999, at 23; Rating 43 of America's Largest HMOs,
NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1996, at 60; How Health PlansStack Up, NEwSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997, at

77; Are HMOs the Right Prescription?,U.S. Naws &

WORLD

News Ranks 271 of the Nation's HMOs, U.S. NEvs & WoR

REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 60; U.S.

REP., Oct. 5, 1998, at 64.
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blood pressure and diabetes, assuring use of appropriate medications;
satisfying members; and providing health information to members!'
While observers have called HEDIS "a welcome attempt to
evaluate the quality of care provided by health plans,"' - they have
acknowledged:
[he information's utility is limited. It relies primarily on
counting the number of members who receive relatively
simple procedures like mammograms and immunizations....
[I]t is difficult to measure quality in such cases [as diabetes,
cancer and other complicated conditions] because of the
differences in the standards of practice in different
locations...
As a result, even Trudy Lieberman, an unpaid member of the
NCQA Board of Directors, and author of several Consumer Reports
articles on assessments of HMOs, has observed that the existing
performance data cannot help shoppers find the best HMO in terms of
individual physician performance.4 1 "That's because there are no good
comparisons.. .on measures like these."' One reason for this is "there
are no exemplary models of health plans or providers who deliver care
that is uniformly and consistently of the highest quality," according to
the Institute of Medicine.51
Report Cards
During the 1990s, three national magazines, Consumer Reports,
Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report, released reports comparing
HMOs' performance." At least two other groups, J.D. Power and

45

National Committee for Quality Assurance, HEDIS 2000 List of Mcasurcs, at

http'J/www.ncqa.org/pageslpolicy/hedisfh00meas.htm.
45
Marner, supra note 31, at 24.
47
See id.
4:Trudy Lieberman, In Search of Quality Health Care, COsuiEr REP., Oct. 199S, at

35; Trudy
49 Lieberman, How Does Your HMO Stack Up? Co*,sut.ER REP., Aug. 1999, at 29.
See id.
50
see id.
51
How GoodIs Your Health Plan?, supra note 44, at 40-41; How Does Your HMO Staci:
Up?, supra note 44, at 28-29; Rating 43 of America's Largest HMOs, supra note 44, at 60;
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Associates and Caredata, prepared regional comparisons of HMOs.52 In
addition, employers, either collectively or individually, conducted their
own evaluations to determine what HMOs to offer and to assist
employees in selecting an HMIOB
. Despite this explosion of ratings,
"[h]ealth-care information today is as confusing as product information
and labeling were some 30 years ago.""
Member Turnover Rates
NCQA requires that accredited IIMOs track the rate at which HMO
members voluntarily leave their plans, as an indicator of consumer
dissatisfaction.55 The number does not include entire groups of
members whose employer has cancelled its contract with the HMO, and
it does not include members who leave the HMO because they
terminated employment with the sponsoring employer. 6 However,
7
there is no way to determine who left for a less expensive HMO.Y

How Health PlansStack Up, supra note 44, at 77; America's Top HMOs, supra note 44, at 69;
America's
Top HMOs, supranote 44, at 81.
52
press Release, Oxford Health Plans, The MEDSTAT Group/J. D. Power and
Associates Study Tracks Health Plan Quality Performance, (June 16, 1998) (PR Newswire).
Consumer Satisfaction:Member Satisfaction Risingfor POS but Fallingfor HMOs, Carcdata
Finds, BNA's HEALTH CAPE DAILY REP., Sept. 1, 1999 (indicating assessment of HMOs in 13
markets).
53
The Minnesota Health Data Institute, under legislative mandate, posts its results on the
Internet for individuals and employers to use. In California, the California Cooperative Health
Care Reporting Initiative conducts surveys for 30 employers and 21 health plans. American
Express surveys its 27,000 employees annually about their satisfaction with 130 HMOs
nationwide. The California Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS) also uses its own
standardized survey. Shelly Reese, What's Behind Those Satisfaction Surveys?, BUS, &
HEALTH, Aug. 1, 1997, at 29. The Greater Detroit Area Health Council, which represents,
among others, the Big Three auto makers, the United Auto Workers and the AFL-CIO, has
adopted common measures for evaluating health plan performance for 1.4 million people. Jack
A. Meyer and Elliot K. Wicks, CoalitionsKeep Quality Alive, Bus. & HEALTH, July 1, 1999, at
30.
Lieberman, supra note 48, at 23. In an earlier article, Lieberman captured the dilemma
with this question: "[IUs a managed-care plan with a mammography rate of 82 percent better
overall than one with a mammography rate of 75 percent?" Trudy Lieberman, In Search of
Quality Health Care, CONSUMER RP., Oct. 1998, at 38.
55
National Committee for Quality Assurance, HEDIS 2000 List of Measures, at
http://wvwv.ncqa.org/pages/policy/hedis/hOOmeas.htm.
Conversation with Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Illinois marketing manager, Chicago, IL (Jan. 4, 2000).
56Conversation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois marketing manager, Chicago, IL
(Jan. 4, 2000).
57
See id.
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While the member turnover rate can indicate potential
dissatisfaction, it too has its limitations. First, most people receive their
insurance through an employer or union on a "take it or leave it
basis.""3 In a typical retail transaction, dissatisfied customers can "vote
with their feet" when they are unhappy with quality and/or service, but
to do so with an HMO would require the individual to pay out of
pocket for something that is already provided as part of his employment
package. 9 The second restriction for HMO members is the restricted
choice of health care providersY? Going to a physician outside the
HMO panel would require the patient to pay out of pocket, unless the
HMO approves. 6'
Moreover, managed care members have, at most, limited
opportunities to move to another HMO?' Not all employers give
employees a choice of several IMOs or other kinds of insurance."
Furthermore, most employers who sponsor multiple HMOs or other
health plans for their employees only allow the employee to change
plans once a year.6 With all these constraints, leaving an HMO hardly
represents a direct or immediate expression of dissatisfaction with the
HlMO or a particular physician.
Is Litigation Another Measure of HMO Performance?
The measures discussed above may indicate the relative performance of
HMOs. Some members, however, have turned to the legal system to
express their dissatisfaction more directly. HMO members and critics
link the effect of the physician-HMO relationship to poor medical

5

sMariner, supra note 31, at 22-23. About 150 million people receive health coverage
through group plans, but only ten million are enrolled in managed care plans as individuals.
Mariner, supra note 31, at note 7 1.
59
Conversation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois marketing manager, Chica:'o, IL
(Jan. 4, 2000). See also, Mariner, supra note 31, at 5, pointing out that, ideally, buyers and
sellers have equal bargaining power, allowing them to make their buying decisions freely.
69
"Managed care plans that have a closed panel of physicians place contraetual restraints
on the patent's freedom to consult any licensed physician." Mariner, supra note 31, at 16
6"Manos, supra note 9, at 212.
62
See id
6
1See id
64"Choosing health-care coverage has become an annual fall ntual for most
Americans. "Lieberman, supra note 26, at 30.
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outcomes, and have sought to hold both accountable." This Comment
now considers whether one ultimate assessment of an HMO's
performance may be its litigation history. This section looks briefly at
the effects of ERISA and theories of liability being applied to HMOs. It
then uses the various national report cards to identify highly rated and
lower-rated HMOs, and looks at their recent appellate history.
As IMOs have crossed (or at least straddled) the line between
health insurance and health care, some members have sought to sue the
HMO, along with the physician, for adverse medical outcomes or
perceived poor quality care.16 "[E]xpanding malpractice liability to
include managed care organizations has become the rage.... Physicians
got squeezed, patients got scared and lawyers got interested.""7 The
dilemma of whether, when and how ERISA preempts suits against
IMOs has been thoroughly discussed in other law review articles"3 and
settled by the U. S. Supreme Court in Pegram v. Herdrich, discussed
below.
Plaintiffs' lawyers have sought to circumvent barriers to litigation
to address the quality of health care received from HMO provider
panels. 69 Suits have used several theories of liability,0 including
vicarious liability/respondeat superior and apparent/implied agency,7 '
breach of fiduciary duty, either by the HMO physician n or the HMO"
65"HMO practices are crossing the line and encroaching into the physician-patient

relationship [and] a trend is developing where HMOs are viewed as engaged in the practice of
medicine." Manos, supra note 9, at 198.
6See id.
67
See William M. Sage, EnterpriseLiability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System,6860 LAw & CONTEmp. PRoBS. 159 (1997).

See id. See also William H. Pitsenberger, "An Apparently IrrationalDistinction": A

Suggestion for Using Equal Protection Arguments to Overcome Conflicts in ERISA
Preemption,32 . HEALTH L. 307 (1999). A recent opinion with a thorough, cogent analysis of
ERISA69preemption is Hinterlong v. Baldwin, 720 N.E.2d 315 (I11.App. 1999).
Robert Pear, Series of Rulings Eases Constraintson Suing HMOs, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.

15, 1999, at Al.

70
Steven F. Banghart, Keith E. Emmons, Daniel H. Melvin, and Mark E. Rust, HMO
Liability
in the Courts, 87 ILL BAR J. 643 (1999).
7
'Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Docket No. 85726, 1999 I11.LEXIS 970 (I11.
Sept. 30, 1999), discussed infra.
72
Neade v. Portes, 2000 Iii. LEXIS 1691 (I11.Oct. 26, 2000) (dismissing patient's cause

of action of breach of fiduciary duty by the physician as being duplicative of a malpractice
cause of action, but noting that the Illinois Managed Care Reform and Patient Rights Act
requires HMOs to disclose financial incentives that could affect patient care).
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corporate negligence, 74 and breach of contract, in cases involving
benefits eligibility disputes, which fall outside the scope of this
Comment.
Assuming creative litigators will continue to file suits against
HMOs, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's Pegran decision in
June 2000, the questions remain: Which HMOs are likely to be sued?
For what causes of action, and on what fact patterns? Do higher and
lower quality HMOs have different likelihood of being sued? Is there
any correlation between the quality of HMO medical care and overall
consumer-patient satisfaction with their health plan, or between the
frequency and nature of litigation and the level of satisfactionT The
remainder of this Comment considers these questions and HMOs'
possible responses to the threat of more litigation.
ANALYSIS
The lMOs Selected for Study
For this Comment, the author arbitrarily but systematically identified
the HMOs rated highest and lowest in at least two of six national
magazine ratings published in the late 1990s."' The highly rated HMOs
included:
Fallon Community Health Plan HMO, Massachusetts (Fallon)
Finger Lakes Blue Choice HMO, New York (Finger Lakes)

73
Pegram
74

v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000), discussed infra
Jones v. Chicago MO Ltd. of Ill.,
2000 WL 637290 (111.
May 18, 2000), discuszed

infra.

75
*"Patients in managed care systems are more likely to be dissatisfied vath their health
care than patients who use the traditional fee-for-service system. Accordingly patients in
managed care plans are probably more likely to claim malpractice than patients vho have the
freedom to choose their doctors." Scott Forehand, Note & Connent Helping the Mcdtcine Go
Down. How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate the Problem of Mcdical Malpractice
Litigation, 14 OMo ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 907, 90S (1999) citing a study of more than 10,000
people showing that patients were up to 20 percent more likely to consider their health care
"very good" or "excellent" when they chose their physicians, Julie Schmittdiel, eL alt, Choice qf
a PersonalPhysician and Patient Satisfaction in a Health Maintcnance Organizattan, 273
JAMA 1596 (1997).
76
See supra,note 51.
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Harvard Pilgrim Health Care HMO, Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island (Harvard-Pilgrim)
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northeast, Connecticut
(Kaiser)
Tufts Health Plan HMO, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island (Tufts)
The lowest ranked plans were:
Aetna US Healthcare, California (Aetna)
CIGNA Healthcare of San Diego, California (CIGNA)
Foundation Health Plan (merged with HealthNet), California
(HealthNet)
NYLCare of the Gulf Coast, Texas (NYLCare)
Prudential Healthcare of Northern California (Prudential)
Of note, only one of the top five HMOs, Kaiser, is a for-profit
corporation; the rest are not-for-profit." By contrast, all of the five
lower-rated HMOs are for-profit subsidiaries of commercial insurance
companies. While all HMOs want to operate in the black, for-profit
HMOs also have an obligation to perform for their stockholders, "a
third party, who is not the payer of the premium, the patient or the
doctor. ' 79 "By comparison, non-profit IMOs tend to be older with
established track records....By law, they must funnel all 'profits' back
into the organization...,.80

77National Commission for Quality Assurance, Accreditation Summary Report, Kaiser
Foundation Healthplan of the Northeast, at Manos, supra note 9, available at
http://www.ncqa.org/pagesinfor/Accreditation%20Summary%2OReports/CTOO6.htm;
Accreditation
Summary
Rep.,
Finger
Lakes
HMO,
available
at
http://www.nrqa.orgpages/infor/Accreditation%20Summary%2Rep.s/NYOO4.htm.
78
National Commission for Quality Assurance, Accreditation Summary Report,
HealthNet,
available
at
http:llwww.ncqa.orgpage/infor/Accreditation%20Summary%2Reports/CAO2O.htm;
Accreditation Summary Report, Aetna Health Plans of California, Inc., North, available at
http://vww.ncqa.org/pages/infor/Accreditation%20Summary%/2OReports/CA002.htm;
Accreditation Summary Report, NYL Care Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., available at
http://www.ncqa.org/pages/infor/Accreditation%20Summary%2ReportsTXO20.htm.
79
G. Arnold Relman, quoted in Meltsner, supra note 22, at 46.
80
See id.
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Three of the top five iMOs, Fallon, Tufts, and Harvard-Pilgrim,
recently received NCQA's new "excellent" accreditation."1 NCQA rated
all of the others "commendable.""- This reflects the observation in the
most recent US News rankings: "A surprise that emerged ...was the

weak relationship between a plan's score and its accreditation status.
accreditation
While it may be logical to assume that plans with full ...
would 3 outperform plans with lower status, it didn't work out that
'

way. 11
For each of the HMOs listed above, the author ran searches in both
LEXS and Westlaw.? There are obvious limitations to this analytic
approach, however structured the selection of subjects. HMOs may

vary in their litigation and settlement strategies. Consumer litigiousness
may vary in different areas. Some HMOs may require that their
members follow an internal appeals process or engage in mandatory,
binding arbitration requirement, which would limit the number and
type of cases that could go to the courts."'

81
NCQA awarded the "excellent" designation to 40 plans with general perfornnce
scores in the top 25 percent of its key measures. NCQA Rccognizes Mation's Best H1calth Plans
with Introduction of New "Excellent" Accreditation Status, Oct. 1, 1999 Pre_3 Releaze, at
http://v-.ncqa.org/pagescommunicationsnewexcellentrel.htnrL
82"NCQA accreditation surveys - which consist of both an on- and off-site component are conducted by teams of physicians and managed care experts. A national oversight
committee of physicians analyzes the team's findings and HEDIS data and then asigns one of
five possible accreditation levels (Excellent, Commendable, Accredited, Provisional, or
Denied). Only about 10 percent of all plans can earn the top designation." National Committee
for Quality Assurance, An Overview, http:l/v,,,.ncqa.orgfpagesmainL~overveew3.htn.
53
Avery Comarow, How We Ranl-d the Plans, U. S. NEWS & IMORLD REU- , Oct. 5,
1998, availableat http:/lwww.usnews.comiunews'issuel9lOO15Shmomhtmu
8The search ran against the all Federal and all state case databases, to identify appellate
suits decided between October 1994 and October 1999, roughly the period that NCQA
performance standards and accreditations have existed. Searches involving HMO3 that mrged
or changed names included all previous and current corporate names. Suits involving Medicare
HIOs, which are subject to federal regulation, were excluded, as were suits that did not
involve care of a patient. See National Committee for Quality Assurance, An Orcrriczi-: NCQA
Tineline,at http://www.ncqa.org/pagesimainrtimeline htm.
SSConversations Dec. 1999 with Len Kurfurst, a Chicago malpractice and in urance
an
defense attorney who generously reviewed and critiqued this Comment as if it v',cre
appellate brief.
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No Link Between Reputation and Litigation
Three recent Illinois cases point out the lack of correlation between
reputation and litigation. 6 Although the causes of action arose in the
early 1990s, before widespread NCQA accreditation and the
publication of many HMO report cards, they are nevertheless
instructive. 87
Pegram v. Herdrich
In Pegram v. Herdrich, the case the U.S. Supreme Court decided in
June, 2000, Cynthia Herdrich saw her Health Alliance Medical Plan
(HAMP) physician Lori Pegram twice in one week for abdominal
pain. 8 Although Pegram identified an inflamed abdominal mass
measuring two-and-a-half by four inches, she failed to diagnose it as
possible appendicitis. 9 She delayed a diagnostic test for another week
and then scheduled it at another HAMP clinic fifty miles away.9" Before
the test, however, Herdrich's appendix ruptured, exposing her body to a
dangerous infection.9'
Herdrich filed a medical malpractice suit against Pegram and
EHAM 92 and won a jury verdict of $35,000 against Pegram in state
court.9 3 HAMP sought removal to Federal court, citing ERISA
preemption.94 In response, Herdrich amended her suit to claim HAMP
had breached its ERISA fiduciary duty.95 This Comment will discuss
the U.S. Supreme Court's June, 2000 holding further below.

86

Pegram, 120 S.Ct. 2143; Petrovich, Docket No. 85726, 1999 Ill.
LEXIS 970; Jones,
2000 WL 637290.
87
NCQA activities became widespread about 1994. Mrs. Petrovich began seeking
medical treatment in 1990. Petrovich, 1999 II1. LEXIS 970, at *1. Mrs. Herdrich's condition
began in 1991. David G. Savage, Cost-Cutting Consequences, ABA J., Feb. 2000, at 30. The
Jones child became ill in 1991. Jones, 191 Ill.2d 278.
88
Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 2147. One author described her as "doubled over from abdominal
pain" on the first visit, which was first diagnosed as a urinary tract infection. On the second
visit, "a few days later," the diagnosis changed to ovarian cyst. See Savage, supra note 87.
89
Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 2147. Savage, supra note 87.
90
Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 2147.
91
Savage, supranote 87.
92
Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 2147.
93
94See

id.
See id.

95

Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2147.
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Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of llinois, Inc.
In Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., plaintiff brought a
cause of action against her physician for negligence in failing to
diagnose an oral cancer, and against her IMO for malpractice, under a
vicarious liability theory.s In September 1990, she had complained to
her -IMO primary care physician of foul mucus in her mouth and
persistent pain in her mouth, tongue, throat, and face."7 He referred her
to specialists, but said her IMO would not approve recommended
tests." Still in pain seven months later, plaintiff again saw a specialist,
who diagnosed cancer in her tongue and larynx."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated "the national trend
of courts is to hold IMOs accountable for medical malpractice under a
variety of legal theories."'"" The court held "An IMO may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent-contractor
physicians under both the doctrines of apparent authority and implied
101
authority."
Jones v. ChicagoHMO, Ltd.
In Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd., the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced
its doctrine of IIO responsibility, holding HMOs have a duty to "act
as would a 'reasonably careful' M4IO under the circumstances.'" -" It
reasoned, "HMOs undertake an expansive role in arranging for and
providing health care services to their members [and] they have
corresponding corporate responsibilities as well."' 3 Twice on January
18, 1991, Sheila Jones called her HMO physician's office because her
three-month-old daughter was "sick, constipated,...crying a lot and felt
very warm."' The doctor returned her call late in the evening and told
her to give the child castor oil.0s The next day, seeing no improvement,

9

"SPetrovich,1999 Ill. LEXIS 970, at *1.

97
See id at *3-*4.
93
See id. at *4.
9
'See id at *5.
"'0 Petrovich, 1999 I11.LEXIS 970, at *14.
'01Petrovich, 1999 111. LEXIS 970, at *52.
'02Jones v. Chicago 11O Ltd. of Illinois, 191
'O3See id.
04

' See id. at 2S2-S3.
")-See id.

Ill 2d 278, 293 (111. 2000).
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Jones took the child to a hospital 06 The child had bacterial meningitis,
which caused her permanent disability.1 7
Citing the doctrine of institutional negligence established in
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, the court
determined HMOs' multiple roles include being a provider of medical
care, which imposed upon them the same duty "to conform to the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.""
While HAMP, Share and Chicago HMO were all defendants
because of physicians' poor medical care, their similarities end there,
since HAMP is now one of NCQA's 40 "excellent" HMOs.' It
received among the highest ratings from US News both in 1997 and in
1998.110 By contrast, neither Share HMO nor Chicago HMO have
NCQA accreditation.'"' This dichotomy between ratings and litigation
continues for the rest of the LIMOs studied for this Comment.
The HMOs Selectedfor Study
As a group, the five highly rated HMOs were party to more appellate
cases than the lower-ranked ones."' The number of cases involving
106See id.

'07Jones, 191 Ill.2d 278, 282-83.
'01See id. at 292-93, citing Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33
Ill.2d 17 (1965), which applies the "principles of common law negligence to hospitals in a
manner that comports with the true scope of their operations".
' 09 National Commission for Quality Assurance, NCQA Recognizes Nation'sBest Health
Plans with Introduction of New 'Excellent' Accreditation Status, press release dated Oct. 18,
1999, availableat http:/iwww.ncqa.org/pages/communications/news/excellentrel.htm.
1 0U.S. News & World Report ranked HAMP fifth of 37 HMOs in the 1997 HMO Honor
Roll. Susan Brink & Nancy Shute, Are HMOs the Right Prescription?,U. S. Naws & WORLD
REP., Oct. 13, 1997), at 60. In 1998, HAMP was 28'h out of 40 HMOs. Joseph P. Shapiro,
There When You Need It: U.S. News & World Report HMO Exclusive Ratings, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., (Oct. 5, 1998), at 64.
"'National Committee for Quality Assurance Health Plan Report Card, available at
http://vww.ncqa.org/pages/hprc/index.htm. This places Share HMO and Chicago HMO in the
minority: about 75 percent of the health plans in the U.S., covering about 80 million people,
now have NCQA accreditation. Michael M. Weinstein, The Grading May Be Too Easy on
Health Plans'Report
Cards,N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 19, 1999, at C2.
" 2For the period studied, the top five HMOs had, collectively, eight appellate cases.
Finger Lakes HMO had none. Harvard-Pilgrim had five: Keene v. Harvard Community Health
Plan, Mass. Super. LEXIS 167 (1999); Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Mass.
Super. LEXIS 166 (1997); Deasy v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Mass. Super. LEXIS 385
(1995); Feeley v. Barr, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 239 (Mass. App. 1996); Harvard Community Health
Plan v. Zack, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 649 (Mass. App. 1992). Fallon, Kaiser and Tufts each had one:
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each HMO varied: one of the best (Harvard-Pilgrim) had as many suits
as a low-ranked one." 3 Some HMOs at both ends of the scale had no or
only one suit."14 For example, Harvard-Pilgrim appeared near the top of
every Newsweek, U.S. News and Consumer Reports HMO list, and,
until recently, had an "excellent" accreditation from NCQA.115

Notwithstanding, it has five appellate cases on record involving patient
care, and one unpublished opinion.1 6 Four of the five were decided in
favor of the patient." 7 At the other end of the rankings, HealthNet, with
low Consumer Reports and Newsweek ratings, had the highest number
of appellate cases on record, although eight were unpublished

Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan,127 F.3d 196 (1" Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan of Conn., No. CV 91-031241-S. 1994 WL 235526 (Conn, Super. Ct.
1994); St. Charles v. Kender, 646 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. App. 1995).
The five lower-rated HMOs, combined, also had six appellate suits dunng the study
period Cigna Healthcare of San Diego and Prudential Health Plan of Califomia had none.
HealthNet had four published and four unpublished opinions: Moms v. HealthNet of California
Inc., 1999 Utah LEXIS 178; Olsen v Foundation Health Plan, 1999 U S. Dist, LEXIS S643;
Roessert v. HealthNet of California, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 343 (DC Cal.); Durham v. HealthNet of
California, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2335. Aetna had one, Aetna Healthplans of California,
Inc. v. Yucaipa-Calimesa Joint Unified School District, 72 Cal.App 46 1175 (CA of
Cal. 1999). NYLCare of the Gulf Coast also had one: Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc, 172
F.3d 3323 (5h Cir. 1999).
" See supra,note 112.
114See supra,note 112.
"15See supra, note 51. In October 1999, NCQA identified Harv ard-Pilgrim as one of it3

40 "excellent" HMOs. See supra, note 109. NCQA has since changed Harvard-Pilgrim's rating
to "commendable," which the HMO is protesting. National Committee for Quality Assurance
Health PlanReport Card,at http:llwv.nqa.orgtpagesihrp~indeoxhtrm
" 6 Seesupra,note I 11.

117Keene v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 167 (order of
default against patient's hospital, a Harvard-Pilgrim provider, for failure to prodJuce portions of
the medical record involving newborn who contracted meningitis and developed brain damage
as a result); Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 166
(1997) (alleging medical malpractice because physician failed to find and treat breat cancer
timely, and plan provided chemotherapy instead of autologous bone nufro",. transplant
treatment to save money); Deasy v. Harvard Community Health Plan, 1995 Mass Super.
LEXIS 3S5 (wrongful death arising out of negligent treatment by HMO); Feeley v. Barr, 41
Mass. App. Ct. 239 (Mass. App. 1996) (lack of informed consent for phyician's use of
"expectant management," which caused pregnant mother's infection and nev.bom's death);
Harvard Community Health Plan v. Zack, 33 Mass. App. Ct 649 (Mass. App, 1992) (HMIO's
denial of further physical therapy treatment for special needs children upheld, bccau!:e if .ave
timely notice of the change in contract terms, prior to renewal).
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opinions."' Of the other four, the patient prevailed in three. 19 HealthNet
won only a suit challenging denial of autologous bone marrow
transplant treatment for breast cancer. 20 All the decisions involving
these HMOs were procedural and did not reach the merits of the case.",
At first blush, the appellate cases display the same dichotomy seen

in Pegram,Petrovich and Jones: HMOs, regardless of their reputations,
can end up in court, sometimes several times over. Do HMOs with
more litigation share any characteristics, despite their ratings? In a

nutshell, the answer is, yes. Compared to its highly rated peers,
Harvard-Pilgrim was the only one with a high complaint ratio.'
Similarly, HealthNet had the highest member turnover in the 1997 US
News rankings (24 percent annually compared to 15-17 percent for the
top HMOs and 19-31 percent for the low-ranked ones).-'

Furthermore, in measures designed to indicate the quality of medical
care received, both Harvard-Pilgrim and HealthNet scored poorly
within their peer groups. 24

18 The unpublished opinions were not included in this study and hence are not listed
here.

"19 Morris v. HealthNet of Cal. Inc., 1999 Utah LEXIS 178 (holding California law, not
Utah law, should determine whether HMO breached good faith and fair dealing by denying
biopsy as non-emergency treatment); Olsen v. Foundation Health Plan, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8843 (upholding plaintiff's motion to remand personal injury suit to state court to determine
whether inadequate medical care was cause of suicide attempt); Roessert v. HealthNet of
California, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 343 (DC Cal. 1996) (suit alleging general and medical negligence
in HMO's treatment of chronic fatigue syndrome remanded to state court).
' 221°Durham v. HealthNet of California, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2335.
1 0f the cases cited supra note 117, eight involved motions for summary judgment
(Nascimento, Deasy, Harvard Community Health Plan v. Zack, St. Charles, Morris, Roessert,
Durham, Aetna Healthplan of California v. Yucaipa-Calimesa). Keene, Johnson, Olsen, Giles
and Turner involved other motions. Feeley was an appeal of a directed verdict.
'22In the 1999 Consumer Reports ratings, nine percent of Harvard-Pilgrim members
reported "trouble getting needed care," compared to five percent of Tufts and Finger Lakes
members. By contrast, 17 to 23 percent of members in lower-ranked HMOs said they had
trouble getting needed care. Ratings and Recommendations: HMOs, CONSUtIER REP., Aug.
1999, at 28-29.
"2State-by-StateRankings, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 69.
124See supra note 122. In addition, U. S. News reported the percent of members who felt
they had access to physicians, with the national average being 84 percent. Harvard had the
lowest score among the top-quality HMOs, 74 percent. Other highly ranked plans ranged from
74 to 91 percent. U. S. News reported only 36 percent of members at Foundation (now part of
HealthNet) felt they had access to physicians. Other lower-ranking plans scored 88 to 93
percent. State-by-State Rankings, U. S. Naws & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 69.
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In summary, highly rated HMOs, like Harvard-Pilgrim and
HAMP, can end up in appellate court as often lower-rated ones. This
validates some of the criticism of managed care report cards, but also
indicates the importance of comparing data about member
dissatisfaction.'2 Finally, the litigation history of all the HMOs

considered in this comment also raises the question of whether the
HMO accreditation process truly conveys whether quality care is
delivered to members, particularly since the NCQA evaluation does not
address potential, pending, or completed litigation. "'i
The Future of HMO Members' Discontent

Thus far, this Comment has looked at ways to evaluate health plans and
ways members can express dissatisfaction with their plans. It has
concluded that, whether a plan has an overall good evaluation or a
weaker one, it may still be subject to litigation. "Managed-care
companies - like makers of cigarettes, lead paint and guns - are under
growing legal attack. This includes at least 16 recent class-action suits
... Several new state laws and measures in Congress could open the
industry to still more suits.1'1 7 Reflecting this public sentiment, the

American Bar Association called the Pegrain case "cost-cutting
consequences."'2' Pegram notwithstanding, the ERISA preemption of
certain state actions against HMOs has begun to weaken, giving rise to

'2"[T]he [managed care plan] report cards are woefully incomplete. They grade
treatment, not outcomes. Outcomes are what most patients care about; lImowing how m2ny
breast cancers were caught early and how many women recovered succezsfully generally
matters ... more than how many women received mammogram." Michael M. Weinstein, Thc'
Grading lay Be Too Easy on Health Plans'ReportCards,N.Y. TIES, Aug. 19, 1999, at C2.
12See supra note 39 for a summary of NCQA accreditation criteria. Of the -MlO
studied and discussed in this Comment, all were accredited. Even sam of highly ranked ones
had "commendable" (the rank below "excellent") ratings from NCQA, and all of the lowerranked IMOs had "commendable" NCQA ratings. The true value of accreditation, from a legal
standpoint, may be that it helps establish the standards with which a "reasonable HMO" must
comply- "Darling... firmly established that, in an action for institutional negligence aginst a
hospital, the standard of care applicable to a hospital may be proved via a number of
evidentiary sources. ... We likewise conclude that, an action for institutional negligence against
an HMO, the standard of care ... may be proved through a number of evidentiary sources..."
Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd., 191 Il.2d 278, 298 (111.2000).
127
Milt Freudenheim, Under Legal Attack, HM 0 's Face a Supreme c urt Test, N.Y.
TaMs, Jan. 4,2000, at Al.
1

23Savage, supra note 87.
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"[c]ivil lawsuits from aggrieved patients."2 9 The American Health
Lawyers Association reports that, between 1980 and 1987, only one
suit was filed against a managed care plan based on the care, treatment

or decision-making for a plan member.'30 Between 1989 and 1997,
between four and 13 cases a year were filed, jumping to at least 20 each
in 1998 and 1999.131
Pegram, Petrovich and Jones, taken together, may indicate what
could be in store for HMOs, in terms of litigation. Although the
Pegram case received widespread scrutiny before and after it was
argued,"3 its holding is actually quite narrow. On behalf of a unanimous
Court, Justice Souter asked "whether treatment decisions made by [an
HMO], acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts
within the meaning of [ERISA].' 33 The Court held these decisions are
not fiduciary acts under ERISA, meaning that patients cannot sue their
HMOs for poor medical outcomes under the ERISA fiduciary duty
3
provision. 1
Reasoning that an M40 physician's decision to treat or not to
treat was "inextricably mixed" with eligibility decisions involving a
member's coverage for particular plan benefits,' 5 Justice Souter wrote:
"we think Congress did not intend... [an] HMO to be treated as a
fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting
through its physicians."'3 6 Alone, this observation comes as good news
to lIMOs seeking to avoid a new theory of liability (breach of ERISA
fiduciary duty) under the Federal law that had previously shielded them
' 29David H. Johnson, ERISA Fiduciary Duty Claims and Managed Care Liability
ImplicationsofHerdrich v. Pegram, The ABA Health Law Section, TmE HEALTH LAWYER, May

1999, at 1. For a summary of the preemption analysis, see Pitsenberger, supra note 68, at 30911.

130Miles J. Zaermski, Esq., "Trends" in Reported Caselaw Allowing For Causesc of
Action Against Managed Care PlansArising From the Care, Decision-Making,and Treatment
Affecting Plan Participants,AM. HEALTH L. Ass'N, HEALTH L.: TOPICAL INSIGHT SEIUES,
February 2000, at Al.
'31See id.
' 32Freudenheim, supra note 127, Al; Savage, supra note 87. "The Supreme Court today
spared managed health care from a potentially fatal legal attack..." Linda Greenhouse, Court
Rejects 33
Some FederalLawsuits Against H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TMES, June 13, 2000, at Al.
1 Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 2147 (2000).
34

1 See id.
135See id.at 2154.
'36 See id. at 2155.
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from most members' causes of actions. 37 The Court has plainly stated
that ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement does not attach to an IMO,
with regard to treatment decisions its doctors make.13
As written, however, the decision leaves open two important
points relevant to prospective plaintiffs and worrisome for lIMOs.
First, the decision frequently and specifically refers to "physician
employees" of HMOs.'39 It makes no reference to whether the Court
intends the decision to apply to HMOs using contracted groups of
independent physicians, rather than paid physician employees, to
deliver services.4 0 Moreover, while the decision specifically declines to
allow malpractice causes of action to enter into federal courts,'" the
Court references, but does not proscribe, state-based malpractice claims
against HMOs:
It is true that in States that do not allow malpractice actions
against HMOs the fiduciary claim would offer a plaintiff a
further defendant to be sued for direct liability, and in some
cases the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the
physician. But we have seen enough to Imow that ERISA was
not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be
sued, or in order to federalize malpractice 42litigation in the
name of fiduciary duty for any other reason.1

137Johnson, supra note 129, at 1.
3

13Pegrami, 120 S. Ct. at 2147.

139See "acting through its physician employees," id at 2147; "all HMO3 acting through
their owner or employee physicians," id. at 2150; "the physician employee would also be
subject to liability," id. at 2158.
IWIAMP was a closed panel or "staff model" HMO, which actually employ3 the

physicians who treat HMO members. "However, the majority of mcdical care is rendered by
physicians who are not directly employed by the [HMO], but who are on a list of affiliated..
independent practicing physicians." David L. Trueman, Managcd Care Liability Today" La.s,

Cases, 41
Theories, and CurrentIssues, 33 J HEALTHL. 191, 194 (Spring 2000).

' "What would be the value to the plan participant of having this kind of ERISA
fiduciary action? It would simply apply the law already available in state courts and federal
diversity actions today, and the formulaic addition of an allegation of financial incentive would

do nothing but bring the same claim into a federal court under federal-question junsdiction."
Pegram,
120 S. Ct. at 2158.
' 42See id.
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The Court's failure to speak against state-based malpractice suits
against HMOs, combined with the holdings of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Petrovich and Jones, indicates that HIMOs could be subject to
more state-based litigation relating to patient care. The American

Health Lawyers Association's survey of suits against HMOs (AHLA
survey) shows that actions against HMOs increased in the late 1990s.'43
Protecting Against Litigation
Using the cases discussed above and the author's past experience in the
managed care industry, the rest of this Comment predicts possible

actions HMOs may take as protection against the changing legal
landscape. 144

The most common cause of action against HMOs, according to the
AHLA survey, was vicarious liability. 45 Monitoring physician
performance and preventing poor medical care pose the greatest
difficulty for HMOs, for several reasons. First, Pegram and the
Harvard-Pilgrim cases show even respected HMOs that employ fulltime physicians cannot prevent bad outcomes. 4 6 Similarly, the HarvardPilgrim cases demonstrate that monitoring performance of individual
employee physicians is difficult. 47 Second, open-panel HMOs that
contract with physicians in private practice have even less involvement

143Zaremsld, supranote 130.

144For 25 years before enrolling in law school, the author held various management
positions in several large health insurance and managed care companies, and was primarily in
involved in developing the managed care programs these companies offered to employer
groups.' 45 0f 109
suits surveyed, 36 stated at least a vicarious
liability cause of action. Zaremski,
supra note 130. For a general discussion of current theories of liability, see Trueman, supra
note 140.
14'Dr. Pegram was part of the Carle Clinic, which also functioned as a for-profit HMO.
Pegram, 120 S.Ct. at 2147. Harvard-Pilgrim is also a staff-model HMO. See Nascimento v.
Harvard Community Health Plan, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 166 at *1 (Mass. Super. 1997).
'47See supra,note 117. The four cases involved a newborn who developed brain damage
after contracting meningitis; a failure to timely find and treat breast cancer; a wrongful death
arising out of negligent treatment; and negligent use of an experimental prenatal treatment that
caused the newbom's death. All of the cases won on procedural grounds, but did not go to trial
on the merits, indicating that out-of-court settlements likely occurred.
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in the actual delivery of care.' These HMOs use a variety of financial
techniques to shift risk to and create incentives for the physicians who
make treatment decisions. ' Among these are paying a blanket fee per
patient (called capitation), to cover any services that may be needed,
withholding a portion of fees paid to use as a future incentives, and
simply obtaining discounted fees from the doctors. 2 The intent behind
these arrangements is to encourage the private physician to serve as a
gatekeeper for the HMO, with a resulting economic reward or risk.'
As Justice Souter noted in Pegram, "in an HMO system, a physician's
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more.'""
Some actions HMOs may take to limit potential malpractice
causes of action are conducting more aggressive performance
monitoring of individual physicians; providing members rith more
information about physician performance; strengthening disclaimers
printed in provider directories; requiring more disclosure by physicians
about potential and pending malpractice suits; and changing their
marketing and operational strategies. Each of these is discussed below.
Performance Monitoring
To date, much of the monitoring of physician performance, as
established by NCQA, involves delivery of preventive services and
treatment of certain chronic and cancer-related conditions.' 3 Faced
with more potential exposure for malpractice, HMOs may seek to target
physicians whose patients file the most complaints. They may provide
"quality of care hotline" numbers, so members can report quality of
care issues or withholding of services.1 More performance profiling

1'Jeffrey E. Shuren, LegalAccountabilityfor UtilizationReview in ERIS.4 Health Plans,
77 N. CAROLNA L. R. 731,751 n.110 (Jan. 1999). David L. Trueman, Managcd Care Liabili,
Today: 49
Laws, Cases, Theories, and Current Issues, 33 J.HE.LH L~w 191,194 (Spring 2000).
1 See Shuren, supra note 148, at n.57. Share Health Plan of Illinois, the HlMO in the
Petrovichsuit, was this type of MHMO: "Share...arranges and pays for health care by contracting
with independent medical groups and practitioners." Petrovich, 1999 111. LEXIS 970, at "5.
'Petrovich, 1999 I1. LEXIS 970, at *5.
151
See idSee also, Trueman, supranote 13S.
'5Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. at 2148.
153
National
Committee
for
Quality
Assurance,
An
Orcrviciw,
at
http/jwww.ncqa.orgpages/mainloverview3.htrm
'-4Conversation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois marketing manager, ChicaZo, IL
(Jan. 4,2000).
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and hotlines for members are likely to meet with physician resistance,
but could help HMOs intervene before litigation emerges, as well as

improve their public image."'
Information
HMO provider directories generally give location and specialty
information, but little more.1 16 By providing additional background

about physicians (such as number of complaints filed and the frequency
with which members leave one physician for another one) HMOs could

help members to identify providers with the most satisfied patients, and
avoid physicians whose performance generates complaints. 51 Fewer
members using physicians who are the subject of frequent complaints
could reduce the likelihood of suits involving the HMO on a vicarious
liability, duty of care or institutional negligence theory.""
Disclaimers
Some HMOs' literature already includes disclaimers that the providers
are independent practitioners, in an attempt to insulate the HM from

liability for the providers' actions. 5' One can assume that, as formal
contracts, HMG-provider contracts are likely to include
indemnification language. Nevertheless, HMOs' attorneys may attempt

155The need to improve the perception held both patients and physicians that HMOs
interfere with treatment decisions and physician performance was underscored when United
HealthCare, a major national HMO, announced it would discontinue certain forms of review of
physician decisions. One paper summed it up as, "United HealthGroup's decision to tell healthplan administrator to but out and let doctors prescribe patient treatment on their own is elating
physicians tired of being second-guessed." Bruce Japsen, Doctor Power No Cure-All, CIE.
TRIB. Nov. 10, 1999, at 3-1.
' 56Conversation with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois marketing manager,
Chicago, IL (Jan. 4,2000).
'57See id.
158Trueman, supra note 140. Astonishingly, the National Practitioner Data Bank, which
hospitals and health plans may use to screen physicians, is not open to the public. See David
Greising, It's Time to Doctor MD Data Bank for Public Access, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at
5-1. See also, Jeffrey A. Lovitky, The National PractitionerData Bank: Coping with the
Uncertainties,
33 J. HEALTH L. 355, 357 (Spring 2000).
159 "[The subscriber certificate states that Share's physicians are independent contractors
and that 'SHARE Plan Providers and Enrolling Groups are not agents or employees of
SHARE." Petrovich, 1999 Ill. LEXIS 970, at *9.
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to draft stronger, clearer language for both documents, and make
disclaimers clearer in sales literature.
Disclosure

NCQA-accredited HMOs are required to obtain information about their
physicians' malpractice history when the physician joins the HMO and

periodically thereafter."" Between these points in time, however, much
patient care is delivered. HMOs may wish to consider requiring their
physicians to notify them, on a confidential basis, of adverse events
involving HMO members.
ChangedMarketing and OperationalStrategies
HMOs frequently assure their members they will receive quality

medical care. 6 ' One IMO physician directory, which was published
before the Petrovich decision, included "We are committed to
delivering quality, choice and value in an affordable health care plan,"

and "We routinely measure our plan's performance to continually
enhance clinical quality."'32 These statements help position the HMO
as a provider of care instead of simply a payer for care and give support
to a plaintiffs apparent agency, vicarious liability or institutional

negligence cause of action. 63 One major Illinois LIMO has already
160

"Does the health plan assess each doctor's qualifications[?] [D]oes the health plan
regularly check the licenses and training of physicians?". National Commission for Quality
Assurance,
What
is
MCO
Accreditation,
availablk
at
http:ll,,,wv.ncqa.orglpageslpolicylaccreditationMCOaccred.htm. "Credentialing: The process
of reviewing a provider's licenses, certifications, insurance, malpractice history, etc. Managed
care organizations credential every provider in their network." National Commission for
Quality Assurance, Finding the Health Plan That's Right for You, available at
http://Nwrv.ncqa.org/pages/communicationsibrotext.htm.
16"'The [Share] handbook states to its members that Share will provide 'all your
healthcare needs' and 'comprehensive high quality services."' Petrovich, 1999 Ill. LEXIS 970
at *7.Sheila Jones testified, "'[Chicago HMO] told me he was a good doctor..."' Jones v.
Chicago2 1O Ltd., 191 Ill.2d 27S, 285 (111.
2000).
16Rush Prudential Health Plans, Rush PrudentialPPO ProviderDirectory April 1997,
at front cover.
163The Petrovich and Jones courts concluded exactly this: "Share held itself out as the
provider of health care vithout informing plaintiff that the care was given by independent
contractors." Petrovich, 1999 Il.LEXIS 970, at *25. "[Blecause HMO undertake an
expansive role in arranging for and providing health care services to their members, they have
corresponding corporate responsibilities as well." Jones, 191 1112d 278, at 293. The Petrovich
court also noted, "the national trend of courts is to hold HMOs liable for medical malpractice
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stopped making marketing statements about the quality of care
members may receive from its contracting providers.1' As additional
protection, HMOs may assign members of their general counsel's legal
staff to sit on internal quality and utilization monitoring committees.
To date, HMOs have invested time, staff and financial resources
into monitoring the quality and quantity of preventive and primary care
services, in part because this was their original mission and in part
because external performance requirements have emphasized these
areas.'65 But, as the suits in this Comment show, the practice of
preventive medicine is not what gives rise to litigation. Pegram,
Petrovich and Jones, and the Harvard-Pilgrim and HealthNet cases, all
involved patients who presented their physicians more than once, with
specific, obvious symptoms which were later misdiagnosed or
mistreated.'1 HIMOs may shift their focus from assuring consistent
delivery of routine, primary care to closer monitoring of the delivery of
acute care, with an eye toward determining what situations are most
likely to result in legal action.
This author suggests one way for HMOs to accomplish this is by
establishing a clearinghouse of suits filed against them at the trial court
level, to help identify where members perceive that delivery of care has
broken down. As research for this Comment demonstrates, it is not
possible to find patterns of litigation for a particular HMO. 67 Therefore,
such a clearinghouse should exist at a national level, perhaps sponsored
by the American Association of Health Lawyers, the American
Association of Health Plans and/or the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association. Only by looking at the facts of all litigation filed against

under a variety of legal theories, including vicarious liability.. .direct corporate negligence,
breach of contract and breach of warranty." Petrovich, 1999 I1. LEXIS 970, at *14.
164Conversation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois marketing manager, Chicago, IL
(Jan. 4, 65
2000).

' "[Flee-for-service payment penalized medical institutions that returned patients to
health. The financing system, [Paul] Ellwood argued, ought to reward health maintenance;
prepayment for comprehensive care could achieve that end." STARR, supra note 7, at 395. One
section of the NCQA accreditation standards addresses "Does the health plan help people

maintain good health and avoid illness?" National Commission for Quality Assurance, What is
MCO Accreditation,
at http://www.ncqa.org/pages/policy/accreditation/MCO/accred.htm.
166See discussion supra,notes 112-119.
'67Between 1980 and Feb. 18, 2000, one survey identified 109 suits filed against HMOs.

Zaermski, supra note 130, at Al.
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all H1MOs will any meaningful patterns emerge to inform efforts to
protect against liability. Similarly, complaints filed against HMOs with
State Departments of Insurance could help identify similar patterns, as
could the appeals required by patient rights legislation.1 3 Moreover,
these tracking efforts could yield better indicators of HMe quality than
any public report card that exists today.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that HMOs have attempted simultaneously to
manage care, reduce the cost of care, and promise their members
"quality" care, without assuming related legal risks and responsibilities.
Despite monitoring and reporting activities, and numerous independent
rating and evaluation methods, HMO medical care has resulted in
litigation. This, together with continuing public dissatisfaction and new
case law, is likely to cause HMOs to look more carefully at how to
reduce their legal risks and produce a more positive public image.

lESAnn H. Nevers, Consumer Managed Care Appcals: Are the Available Proccdural
ProtectionsFundamentallyFair?,33 . HEALTH L. 287 (Spring 2000).
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